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Introduction 
 
 Public opinion has a specific influence on the formulation of public policy 
(Howlett, 2000) in democratic regimes where rulers rely on newer forms of public 
consultation, are accountable to voters, and need legitimacy (Echegaray, 2001). Thus, 
although foreign policy cannot be considered a "traditional" public policy (Lentner, 2006), 
the perception that public opinion has regarding this subject has become a matter of 
concern for academics and policymakers (Faria, 2008). 
 Historically, it was thought that due to the average citizen's lack of interest in 
international affairs (Lippmann, 1932; Mueller, 2002), public opinion had little influence 
over foreign policy formulation (Jacobs and Page, 2005). Nevertheless, over time certain 
issues of a greater sensitivity, such as the number of deaths in military operations 
(Aldrich et al., 2006, p. 478), have captured the public's attention and repeatedly risen 
to importance on the electoral agenda (Holsti, 1992). As a consequence, this has 
increased the influence of public opinion on foreign policy formulation in developed 
countries (Foyle, 2004).  
 With regard to emerging countries, processes such as economic liberalization 
have meant that civil society is increasingly taken into account in discussions about 
foreign policy. A clear example is the Brazilian case, in which just after the end of the 
military dictatorship and the subsequent democratization of the public sphere, foreign 
policy formulation has become increasingly complex, now including civil society actors 
such as trade unions, NGOs, business associations, and academics (Milani and Pinheiro, 
2013). In this regard, it has been noted that the average Brazilian voter has begun to 
associate his/her economic welfare with the results achieved by the government in 
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foreign affairs (Lopes and Faria, 2014), which has led to the creation of an agenda in 
public opinion regarding foreign policy (Lopes, 2011). 
 Our article aims at contributing to the public opinion literature surrounding 
perceptions of foreign policy issues in emerging countries. More particularly, this study 
investigates whether these perceptions are sensitive to framing effects. The main 
objective of our work is to understand the sensitivity of Argentines to framing about 
Brazil's growing power. To this end, we applied an experimental survey in Argentina to a 
convenience sample composed of 1,530 students belonging to the Universidad de Buenos 
Aires (59% of the sample) and the Universidad Nacional de Avellaneda (41%). We 
subsequently looked at whether new information about Brazil's economic growth and 
military spending changed respondents' opinions on the best strategy Argentina might 
adopt in relation to Brazil: align itself with its neighbor or seek new regional partners to 
counterbalance Brazil's power. 
The objective of this work is also based on the literature analyzing (a) the historic 
rivalry between the two countries (Selcher, 1985; Russell and Tokatlian, 2011; Merke, 
2015), (b) the leadership role that Brazil has assumed recently (Malamud, 2011; 
Schenoni, 2012; Mouron and Onuki, 2015), and (c) the possible reactions of middle 
powers to the regional hegemon's growth (Kaufman, 1992; Schroeder, 1994; Waltz, 
2000). 
 Our findings show that when respondents receive information about Brazil with 
no point of comparison with Argentina (see Appendix I), the impact on their opinions is 
null. However, when Brazil's level of growth and military spending are contrasted with 
Argentina's (see Appendix II), the interviewees prove to be sensitive to framing effects, 
with an inclination toward thinking that Argentina should seek new partners to 
counterbalance Brazilian power. In turn, this effect is even greater among people who 
reported that they did not stay regularly informed about international affairs and among 
those who believed that Argentina has a greater role in the international arena. This 
finding shows that survey experiments can generate effects that are only observable 
among particular subgroups of our samples (Barabas and Jerit, 2010, p. 226). 
 Our article is structured as follows. First, we contextualize our research problem, 
presenting a historical evolution of the relationship between Argentina and Brazil and 
pouring through the public opinion research aimed at capturing Argentines perceptions of 
their neighbor. Then we delve into the theoretical framework, addressing the debate 
about framing effects and drawing on a few survey experiments on foreign policy issues 
conducted in the United States. Next, we explain our methodology and present our 
survey results without considering the different framings. We then go on to discuss the 
results of our experimental research and, finally, our conclusions, providing suggestions 
for a future research agenda. 
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From rivalry to regional hegemony 
 
 Brazil is the most important country in Argentina's contemporary foreign policy 
(Russell and Tokatlian, 2011). However, throughout their history, the two countries—the 
largest in South America—have gone through phases of rivalries and alliances, only 
stabilizing their relationship in 1985 with the rapprochement between presidents Alfonsin 
and Sarney in Foz do Iguaçu. Since then, Brazil has been seen as Argentina's closest ally 
and vice-versa (Selcher, 1985; Hirst, 1987; Bandeira, 1987). 
 In economic terms, bilateral trade grew exponentially between the two with the 
creation of Mercosur in 1991. As Figure 1 shows, Argentina enjoyed a trade boom during 
the 90s, with the trend reversing after the deep crisis of 2001, when Brazil started to set 
the pace for the countries' commercial relationship. Today, even though 20% of 
Argentine exports go to the Brazilian market, Argentina absorbs only 8% of its neighbor's 
exports, which enjoy both a higher aggregate value and a higher level of industrialization 
(Bernal-Meza, 2008). 
 
Figure 1 
Evolution of bilateral trade 
 
  
 
Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from UN Comtrade. 
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On the other hand, analyzing the historical evolution of both countries using the 
National Material Capabilities Index2, we can see that the power gap between the two 
has grown steadily since 1956 when the Kubitschek administration came into power 
(1956-1961) (Sikkink and Wolfson, 1993) (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 
Share of global power (%) 
 
 
    Source: Elaborated by the authors using data from Correlates of War. 
 
Taking as a reference the theoretical framework of the Realist school, when it 
comes to foreign policy, regional middle powers like Argentina have two choices 
regarding regional hegemonic power: stand with it or counterbalance its power. While the 
first strategy consists in following the regional hegemon's policies, counterbalancing can 
be approached in two ways: (a) externally, by combining material capabilities with 
countries in the same situation; or (b) internally, by mobilizing its own resources to more 
effectively resist the hegemonic country. 
 Historically, Argentina tried to counterbalance Brazilian power following strategy 
(b). Nevertheless, by the mid 1980s, when Brazil achieved a clear military superiority, 
Argentina once again was forced to choose between two foreign policy strategies 
regarding its neighbor: align itself with Brazil to achieve greater relevance in the 
international arena, or align itself with other regional countries in order to counterbalance 
Brazilian power.  
                                                          
2 Index composed of six variables: (a) Population, (b) Urban population, (c) Iron and Steel production, (d) 
Energy consumption, (e) Number of soldiers, (f) Military budget (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972). 
FRAMING EFFECTS ON FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
OPINIÃO PÚBLICA, Campinas, vol. 22, nº 1,abril, 2016 
199  
 Among the research that has systematically tried to capture the perceptions of 
the Argentine public regarding foreign policy, the efforts made by the Argentine Council 
for International Relations through the project "La opinión pública argentina sobre 
política exterior y defensa" should be noted3. In the 20024, 20065, 20106, and 20157 
editions, one of the questions included asked with which country Argentina should 
establish closest relations. If we focus only on "Brazil" as an answer (see Figure 3), we 
can see that public opinion has remained generally stable over time, reaching a peak in 
positive responses of 18% in 2006 and 2015, but remaining behind options such as 
"Europe" in 2002 and 2006 (24% and 27%, respectively) and the "United States" in 2010 
and 2015 (47% and 21%, respectively). Meanwhile, policy-makers put Brazil as the 
second most chosen option in the 2002 and 2006 editions, both times behind the United 
States. However, this configuration changed in the 2010 edition, with Brazil taking first 
place with 42% of the valid responses and China securing second place with 18%. 
Brazil's relevance decreased to 29% in 2015, but it has still remained the most chosen 
response. 
Figure 3 
Perception about Brazilian relevance (%) 
 
           
Source: Elaborated by the authors using data from the Argentine Council for International 
Relations (2015). 
 
                                                          
3 Along with Latinobarometer research (<http://www.latinobarometro.org/>) and the work focused on 
elites carried out by the Nupri-USP (Albuquerque, 2000, 2001), this is the only initiative that consistently 
conducts traditional surveys in order to capture Argentine perceptions regarding international affairs.  
4 2,408 people and 192 opinion leaders interviewed between November 15th and December 15th, 2001.  
5 1,616 people and 175 opinion leaders interviewed between October 8th and October 23rd, 2006.  
6 1.606 people and 170 opinion leaders interviewed between November 17th and November 28th, 2010.  
7 1.600 people and 100 opinion leaders interviewed between July and August of 2015.  
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At this point, it is worth asking ourselves how sensitive Argentines' perceptions 
on foreign policy are to framing effects. Drawing on the literature on framing effects, in 
the next section we present our own theoretical framework together with some 
experiments applied in the United States that focus their attention on specific foreign 
policy issues. 
 
Theoretical framework: framing effects and foreign policy 
 Research on framing effects can be found throughout the Social Sciences, as well 
as in various subfields of the Political Science field (Druckman, 2001, p. 226). In fact, the 
high interest in the topic has often been accompanied by a lack of clarity in the definition 
of what exactly framing effects are and how they influence public opinion (Nelson, Oxley 
and Clawson, 1997). To account for this conceptual vagueness, this article defines 
framing effects as "small changes in the presentation of an event or topic, but which 
have large effects on the perception that the public has regarding these issues" (Chong 
and Druckman, 2007, p. 104).  
 Since its inception, the specialized literature has shown that the way in which a 
question is worded has the ability to influence respondents' answers (Rugg and Cantril, 
1942, 1944; Payne, 1951; Schuman and Presser, 1977, 1981). However, with the 
passing of time and advances in the area, framing effects have come to be classified into 
two main groups: (a) those stimuli that, while presenting the same data (but in a 
different way), alter interviewees' preferences; (b) those stimuli that focus their attention 
on certain topics and cause interviewees to focus on particular issues at a moment at 
which they are forming opinions8 (Druckman, 2001, p. 228-230). Our work is in line with 
the first type of research, which tries to analyze how the same piece of information, 
when presented differently, can affect an interviewee's opinions.  
 Among the classic works that use this approach, the foundational article by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) is certainly among the most noteworthy. Through an 
experiment involving 307 students from the University of British Columbia, the authors 
show that when deaths resulting from a given health program were presented relative to 
the number of patients, respondents were more likely to support the initiative than when 
they were stimulated simply by the information in absolute terms. In contrast, when the 
given information focused on the lives that could be saved, the framing effect reversed, 
and the students showed themselves to be more supportive in relation to the program 
than when they were stimulated by the information in absolute terms. Drawing on this 
                                                          
8 A classic example of this type of research—one that also takes into account the question order effect—is 
the work carried out by Hyman and Sheatsley (1950). Through an experiment applied in 1948, the authors 
show that when first exposed to the possibility that the USSR allowed American journalists to enter the 
Soviet Union, the interviewees showed themselves to be more receptive to the belief that the United States 
should do the same with their communist counterparts. On the other hand, those who first were requested 
to express their opinion about the possibility of Soviet journalists working in the US presented lower 
acceptance rates when compared to the other group.      
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research, a great number of studies since have tried to analyze how framing effects can 
affect public opinion perceptions on foreign policy issues9.  
 Undoubtedly the topic that has been discussed most among foreign policy issues, 
mainly in the American literature, has been war and the impact of casualties on public 
opinion perceptions (Gartner, 2008). Boettcher and Cobb found that when combat 
casualties are presented relative to enemy casualties, the negative effect of the latter 
information is activated and support for the war increases (Boettcher and Cobb, 2006, p. 
849). However, other recent research into framing effects related to this topic has 
presented different results. Americans are concerned not only with the proportion of 
casualties, but also with their distribution across society (Kriner and Shen, 2013). In 
turn, these casualties are tolerated more if a future victory is perceived as likely (Gelpi, 
Feaver and Reifler, 2009). Thus, we can affirm that framing effects are not homogeneous 
and may be influenced by individual, as well as situational, factors (Boettcher and Cobb, 
2009, p. 692). 
 On the other hand, other authors have focused their attention on issues such as 
international trade and the propensity of citizens to support economic integration 
processes. Hiscox (2006) observed for the American case that those people stimulated 
by framing that included potential loss of jobs were less likely to support trade with other 
countries than those who did not receive the job loss framing. The author found that less 
educated people are more sensitive to framing effects, demonstrating again that these 
effects are not homogeneous and that it is always important to take into consideration 
heterogeneous effects across different subgroups of the population (Hiscox, 2006). In a 
related work, after replicating Hiscox's experimental survey in Argentina, Ardanaz, 
Murillo and Pinto (2013) found that individuals' material conditions factor into explaining 
both their perceptions on trade policy and, therefore, their sensitivity to framing effects. 
 Given what we have analyzed so far, we can conclude that: (a) the question 
regarding the degree of sensitivity of public opinion in relation to framing effects on 
foreign policy issues is still a matter of discussion; (b) there are studies that have 
addressed specific foreign policy issues, but few have investigated matters of bilateral 
relations; (c) almost all of the existing literature has focused its attention on public 
opinion in developed countries, mainly especially the United States.  
 The present work furthers this research agenda by providing evidence from an 
emerging country, Argentina, on how public opinion there reacts to information regarding 
the growth and military spending of the country's main ally, Brazil. Ultimately our goal is 
to see if these stimuli affect respondents' perceptions. If so, this would reveal public 
opinion's sensitivity to framing effects related to foreign policy. 
 
 
                                                          
9 For a summary of all of the articles published until 2003 addressing the issue of framing effects on US 
foreign policy, see Mintz and Redd (2003). 
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Methodological design 
 
 The use of experimental methods has recently expanded into the fields of Political 
Science and International Relations (Hyde, 2010, p. 73). In this regard, although there is 
a significant history of experimental work in this area (Morton and Williams, 2010, p. 9), 
the discipline, as a whole, has seen the resurgence of this methodology in recent years, 
becoming a widely accepted approach (Druckman et al., 2006, p. 634). Nevertheless, as 
pointed out by Turgeon and Rennó, this type of methodology is still underused in Brazil 
and Latin America (Turgeon and Rennó, 2010, p. 147). 
 In summary, the great advantage of experimental research is that it allows us to 
manipulate our independent variable, while controlling for the remaining factors that 
could influence our dependent variable (Neuman and Robson, 2004, p. 205; Babbie, 
2013, p. 238). Thus, in contrast with observational research such as cross-sectional and 
panel surveys (Gaines, Kuklinski and Quirck, 2007, p. 1-2), experimental studies allow us 
to isolate the effect of the variable we want to analyze and, therefore, are more suitable 
for answering some specific research questions, particularly those involving causal 
mechanisms (Morton and Williams, 2010, p. 12). 
 Our experimental data comes from a survey applied at the Universidad de Buenos 
Aires (UBA) and the Universidad Nacional de Avellaneda (UNdAv) between April 7th and 
May 30th, 201410 to a convenience sample composed of 1,530 students in the Human 
Sciences11. We chose this type of sample because, despite having some limitations, it has 
been shown to behave in the same way as general population samples (Druckman and 
Kam, 2009). Moreover, given the ease of recruiting students, using this type of sample 
offered an efficient way to test our initial hypotheses before generalizing our theory to 
the general population (Dasgupta and Hunsinger, 2008, p. 94).  
 With 308,000 students12, UBA is the oldest and most prestigious university in 
Argentina13. Before entering the university, students must pass a common course that 
lasts at least one year and has a 40% dropout rate. In turn, professors and the system 
as a whole are very demanding compared to other universities, especially for those 
students who have financial limitations and who must work. Thus, only 23% of UBA 
students graduate. 
 On the other hand, located in Avellaneda, on the outskirts of the city of Buenos 
Aires, UNdAv was founded in 2011 and saw its first graduates in 2015. With 9,311 
                                                          
10 A pre-test was applied in early December of 2013 to ensure that the questions were clear enough for all 
participants. 100 students answered the questionnaire, and the question that tried to capture political 
affinity in relation to the government had to be modified, since in its original format it generated a rejection 
superior to 10%. 
11 Of those 1,530 respondents, 13 were excluded from the final sample because they chose not to submit 
the questionnaire. 
12 Census applied in 2011 
<http://www.uba.ar/institucional/censos/Estudiantes2011/estudiantes%202011.pdf>. 
13 If we were to only consider the indicators "academic reputation" and "reputation among employers” from 
the QS ranking, UBA would be the best-positioned university in Latin America.  
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students—most of them first-generation college attendees14—this university seeks to 
fulfill a social commitment, serving as a tool for the reintegration of young people who 
were excluded from the university system, preparing them to enter the labor market. In 
this sense, the courses offered are quite diverse, responding to a social environment 
different from that of traditional universities such as the UBA (see Table 1). 
 With the aim of obtaining a more accurate representation of Argentine society, 
we conceived of our sample including students from both universities, rather than simply 
students from either an elite institution (UBA) or a public university with a specific profile 
such as UNdAv. 
 
Table 1 
Comparison between universities 
 
 
Observations 
Visited 
Brazil (%) 
Family 
members 
Monthly 
family income 
(AR$) 
Average 
age 
Born in Buenos 
Aires (%) 
UBA 893 55 4,15 18000 23,8 82 
UNDAV 623 28 4,23 12500 25,5 91 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
 
 To conduct the survey, we came into contact with professors in the Human 
Sciences at both universities with the help of the academic staff. With their approval, we 
scheduled times at which we could interrupt their lessons and carry out the survey. We 
avoided giving participants prior knowledge about the research in order to prevent them 
from actively seeking information about international affairs before taking the survey. 
Students were simply invited to participate in a public opinion poll. To incentivize 
participation, students were offered two vouchers (worth AR $1,000) for books. As 
suggested by McDermott (2014), in order to maintain anonymity, participants' personal 
information was collected on a separate sheet of paper and kept apart from the answers.  
 After answering five questions about foreign policy, Argentina, and its relevance 
in the international arena, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
experimental treatments or to the control group15. Both treatments provided real 
information about Brazilian GDP growth over the last ten years, the sum of money spent 
by Brasilia on military expenditures, and the number of troops the country has. The only 
difference was that one of the texts presented the information in an absolute way (see 
Appendix I), while the other did so relative to Argentina (see Appendix II). As suggested 
by Boettcher and Cobb (2009, p. 684), a third of our sample did not receive any 
stimulus, thus serving as the control group necessary to estimate the exact impact of 
                                                          
14 They are the first in their families to attend college. 
15 Questionnaires were applied by three research assistants supervised by one of the authors. We would 
like to emphasize that their roles were simply to make sure each person received the treatment to which 
he or she was assigned, thus avoiding any problem of contagion. 
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each type of framing. The following procedure was used to assign participants to the 
three different groups: the absolute treatment was coded as 1, the relative as 2, and the 
control group as 0. Then we randomized the distribution of these 3 numbers among 900 
(UBA) and 650 (UNdAv) cases and mixed the questionnaires according to this random 
distribution.   
 Immediately after these stimuli, respondents were questioned about which 
strategy would be more suitable for Argentina: (a) align with Brazil or (b) seek new 
regional partners to counterbalance Brazilian power. Also, to more broadly capture 
Argentinian public opinion perceptions regarding international issues, participants had to 
tell us which they felt were the three most relevant countries in the international arena, 
the three countries they believed would be the most important in the next ten years. We 
also asked respondents to tell us if they believed Brazil was a leader in South America 
and if they think Argentina should imitate its behavior. 
 Moreover, we included a number of questions in order to control for political 
variables: (a) political ideology16; (b) government approval17; (c) Argentinian relevance 
in the international arena as proxy of nationalism18; (d) the frequency with which 
respondents inform themselves about foreign affairs19. Finally, classic socioeconomic 
questions such as those inquiring about age, sex, gender, and income were also 
presented. To compare the subsamples, we used simple tests of hypotheses. To 
incorporate the controls, we used Probit logistic regressions. 
 
General results: align with a future global power and a regional leader  
 
 Next, we will present the results of the survey without considering the treatment 
effects. First, as we can see in Table 2, more than 77% of those interviewed believe that 
Argentina should align with Brazil and not seek regional partners in order to 
counterbalance its power. 
 
 Table 2 
 Should Argentina align with or counterbalance Brazil? 
 
Strategy Frequency Percentage 
Align 1141 77,7 
Counterbalance 329 22,3 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
                                                          
16 Respondents placed themselves on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 was extreme left and 10 extreme right.  
17 Respondents placed themselves on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 meant that they totally disagreed with the 
government's policies and 10 meant that they totally agreed.  
18 Respondents placed Argentina on a scale of 1 to 10 in terms of its relevance in the international arena, 
with 1 being of little relevance and 10 being very relevant.   
19 Respondents had to answer how often they informed themselves about international affairs, having the 
options: daily, 2 to 3 times a week, once a week or not usually.  
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Second, we can see that Argentinians consider there to be only two major global 
powers today. When consulted on which are the three most relevant countries in the 
international arena20 (see Table 3), the United States and China stand out well above the 
others, with 92% and 73% of the responses respectively. It is noteworthy that Russia 
was the third most selected country with 33%; we believe this result can be explained by 
the proximity of the implementation of the survey to events happening in Ukraine and to 
the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation21. Finally, only 24% of respondents 
mentioned Brazil as a current global power, taking fifth place, behind Japan. 
 
Table 3 
Current powers (%) 
 
Country Percentage 
USA 92.3 
China 73.4 
Russia 33.4 
Japan 32.7 
Brazil 24.7 
UK 21.6 
Other 6.4 
Argentina 6.4 
France 4.6 
India 4.4 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
 
When asked which would be the three most powerful countries in the next ten 
years22, the answers appear to be more evenly distributed (see Table 4). China retains 
almost the same percentage (68%) but now is the most chosen country, slightly above 
the United States, which falls to 61%. For its part, Brazil attains 51% of the preferences, 
more than double the rate of responses pertaining to the present, making Brazil the third 
most selected country on the list. This reflects Argentinians' optimism about the future of 
its neighbor. 
 
  
                                                          
20 This was applied as a closed question with ten options presented in alphabetical order. Participants had 
to choose three of them. 
21 Crimea was annexed by the Russian Federation on March 18, 2014, two weeks before the survey was 
applied. 
22 It was applied as a closed question, with ten options presented in alphabetical order. Participants had to 
choose three of them. 
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Table 4 
Future powers (%) 
 
Country Percentage 
China 68.3 
USA 60.9 
Brazil 51.3 
Japan 31.2 
Russia 26.8 
India 19.7 
Argentina 16.2 
UK 11.4 
Other 11.0 
France 3.2 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
   
Moving forward with questions that tried to capture Argentine perceptions on 
international affairs, we note again that there is a strong consensus about Brazil being 
the most important South American country. Generally, almost 65% of respondents 
believed that Brazil is the regional leader (Table 5), although this perception is inversely 
proportional to the perception of Argentina's relevance in the international arena (see 
Figure 4). 
 
Table 5 
Do you think that Brazil is a regional leader? 
 
  Frequency Percentage 
No 523 35 
Yes 973 65 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
 
 To calculate this last probability, we took the marginal probabilities of a logistic 
regression and plotted them to facilitate their interpretation (see Figure 4). Thus, we see 
that the probability of Brazil being considered a regional leader falls from 80% to 40% as 
we move from respondents who believe that Argentina is irrelevant to the international 
arena (value 0), to those who think it is most relevant (value 10). 
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Figure 4 
Plotted probability of Brazil being seen as a regional leader 
 
  
 Source: Elaborated by the authors using Clarify (Tomz et al., 2003) 
 
 Finally, 44% of the respondents appeared to believe that Argentina should hold 
Brazil up as a model, although for this question the variation of responses among 
different subgroups was considerable. Those participants who had posited themselves on 
the left of the ideological spectrum tended to believe to a lesser extent that the 
Argentinian government should follow Brazil's example (see Figure 5). On the other 
hand, compared to those who declared support for Kirchner's policies, those with a 
negative view of the Kirchner administration tended to believe more strongly that 
Argentina should imitate its neighbor. Like Figure 4, Figure 5 is a visual representation of 
the marginal probabilities calculated using logistic regression. 
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Figure 5 
Plotted probability of considering Brazil to be a good example 
 
 
 
   Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
 
This is probably one of the most important findings of this section, as it confirms 
Russel and Tokatlian's hypothesis, which suggest that the Brazilian image has been 
historically used in Argentinian domestic debates as an "inverted mirror," featuring Brazil 
as a rising power and Argentina as a country in decline (Russell and Tokatlian, 2011, p. 
258). This does not necessarily mean that people who used to support Kirchner's 
administrations had a negative view of Brazil, but it does suggest that those who were 
opponents of Kirchner's government used Brazil's success in order to criticize the 
government in power. 
 
Framing effects   
 
 Analyzing the results of the survey with the differences between each treatment 
group and the control group in consideration, we can see that framing effects indeed 
changed participants' perceptions, albeit in a heterogeneous way. 
 Argentines who received absolute information regarding Brazilian growth, its 
military spending, and its number of soldiers proved to have perceptions similar to those 
who received no stimulus (control group). Meanwhile, those who received information 
comparing Argentina to its neighbor tended toward the idea that Argentina should seek 
FRAMING EFFECTS ON FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
OPINIÃO PÚBLICA, Campinas, vol. 22, nº 1,abril, 2016 
209  
new regional partners to counterbalance Brazilian power (26% vs. 18%) (see Table 6).  
These findings support the theory that in order to fully grasp what large numbers mean, 
it is necessary to have a reference point closer to our reality (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981). 
 
Table 6 
 Difference between treatments and control groups 
 
 
 
 As a robustness measure, we compared the treatments, including controls, with 
individual characteristics through a logistic regression. As we can see in Figure 6, the 
previous findings hold even after including controls. These variables are: the ideology of 
the person (a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 10, with10 representing the extreme 
right), how often the person informs themselves about foreign affairs (ordinal variable, 
ranging from 0 to 3), a variable about the person's opinion on Argentina's role in the 
world (categorical variable ranging from 1 to 10, 10 being "very important"), opinion 
about the current government (categorical variable ranging from 1 to 10, 10 being "very 
favorable"), family income (ordinal variable), university degree (fixed effects for careers), 
the person being nationalist or not (dummy variable based on self-declared perception), 
gender (dummy, 1 being "man"), and a dummy for the university (UBA or Undav).  
 
  
  
Argentina should counterbalance Brazil 
 Treatment Control Absolute Relative 
Average 0.18 0.22 0.26** 
Observations 476 524 470 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
Note: Two tailed T Test. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01;  
*** p < 0.001. 
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Figure 6 
 Treatment effects with control variables  
 
            
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
 
A second empirical strategy consisted of analyzing whether the treatment effect 
was more or less significant for certain subgroups of our sample. What we observe is that 
among people who usually get little information about international affairs, the relative 
treatment was 64% more effective than the one we had previously observed. That is, 
46% of uninformed people chose to counterbalance Brazilian power after receiving the 
comparative treatment. In turn, among nationalists this effect was subtly higher than the 
one for the general population—just 4.6% higher than the 26% associated with the 
general sample (see Table 7). 
 Thus, this finding reinforces the idea that while some framings can have no effect 
on public opinion perceptions, others may have an effect that is conditional on or 
amplified by respondents' characteristics (Knoll, Redlawsk and Sanborn, 2011). Donovan 
and Jalleh (1999) suggest that the degree of involvement of individuals with regard to 
the issue addressed may alter their sensitivity toward framing. To summarize the 
authors' argument, while negative framing would be more effective than positive framing 
among people with a high degree of involvement, the relationship reverses when 
respondents' interest is low, making positive framings more effective. 
 
 
 
  
Absolute Treatment
Relative Treatment
Left - Right scale
How often gets informed
Role of Argentina internationally
Importance of Foreign Policy
Evaluation of the government
Family income
University degree
Nationalist
Man
UBA
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
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Table 7 
Treatment effects by subsamples 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.  
Note: T test between parentheses. Jacknife Standard Errors. Statistical significance: * p < 0,05;  
** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 Is public opinion sensitive to framing effects on foreign policy issues? It depends. 
Drawing on novel experimental data, we arrive at some findings that contribute to an 
ongoing discussion in the literature and present empirical evidence from emerging 
countries that until now have received little attention. 
 As other authors have pointed out (Flachaire and Hollard, 2008; Barabas and 
Jerit, 2010, p. 226), survey experiments generate effects that are observable only 
among particular subgroups of our samples and, due to this, cannot be extrapolated to 
the entire population. 
 Our findings show that the frequency with which people stay informed about 
international issues is a determining factor in explaining how sensitive they are to 
framing effects on foreign affairs. In this sense, the more a person declares that they 
stay informed, the less sensitive he/she will be to framing effects on foreign policy 
issues. With this in mind, we might ask ourselves from which source individuals are 
receiving information about international affairs. The literature suggests that big media 
plays a gatekeeping role regarding foreign policy issues (Hill, 2003, p. 275) since it is the 
main channel through which most of the population receives information on themes 
(Puglisi and Snyder, 2011) with which we do not have personal, daily contact (Soroka, 
2003, p. 28). However, in recent years new media and alternative forms of 
communication have gained space, and with the increasing use of social networks the 
monopoly of traditional media may be in dispute. 
 
Degree of nationalism 
Political 
ideology 
Degree of 
information 
Supports 
kirchners 
 
Nationalist 
Non-
nationalist 
Left Right 
Very 
informed 
Little 
informed 
No Yes 
Absolute 
treatment 
0.252 0.121 0.176 0.206 0.203 0.172 0.14 0.271 
 
(1.83) (0.86) (1.63) (0.88) (1.57) (1.13) (1.11) (1.74) 
Relative 
treatment 
0.272* 0.275 0.257* 0.26 0.134 0.467** 0.249 0.277 
 
(1.99) (1.88) (2.32) (1.12) (1.04) (2.98) (1.92) (1.78) 
         Controls Si Si Si Si Si Si Si Si 
         Observations 650 632 1039 243 761 521 753 529 
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 On the other hand, we also find that the more relevance a person gives to his 
country in the international arena, the more susceptible he/she is to information that 
shows its weakness compared to other countries. This finding is interesting if we think 
from Putnam's logic of two-level games (1988). Politicians might try to influence the 
electorate and gain an advantage in the domestic debate using a nationalist discourse. 
Building on this idea, we also corroborate Russel and Tokatlian's hypothesis, which 
suggests that the Argentinian opposition had used the Brazilian image as an "inverted 
mirror," presenting Brazil as an emerging power and Argentina as a country in decline in 
order to criticize the previous government (Russel and Tokatlian, 2011, p. 258). 
 Finally, as we have shown, most studies that have tried to analyze framing 
effects on foreign policy issues have relied on data collected in developed countries, 
mainly the United States. Given this reality, we believe that by applying our experiment 
in a developing country we are contributing an important new case study to a 
longstanding discussion. However, we also know that cultural differences and specific 
characteristics of each country may affect how sensitive people are to external affairs 
(Hermann and Ozkececi-Taner, 2011). For these reasons, in order to draw general 
conclusions about "Public Opinion," we should replicate this research in countries with 
different characteristics, isolating each country's specific effects. 
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 APPENDIX I   
 
Absolute treatment 
 
"De acuerdo a estadísticas del Banco Mundial, el Producto Bruto Interno de Brasil alcanzó en 2013 la 
suma de U$S 2.253 mil millones de dólares, habiendo crecido un 340% en los últimos 10 años. A su 
vez, las Fuerzas Armadas brasileras están compuestas por 327 mil tropas activas y su presupuesto 
alcanzó en 2013 la suma de U$S 30,3 mil millones." 
According to World Bank statistics, the Brazilian Gross Domestic Product in 2013 reached the sum of 
US $2.253 billion dollars, growing 340% over the last 10 years. The Brazilian Armed Forces are 
composed of 327,000 active troops and its budget reached the amount of US$30.3 billion in 2013. 
 
 
APPENDIX II 
 
Relative treatment 
 
"De acuerdo a estadísticas del Banco Mundial, el Producto Bruto Interno de Brasil alcanzó en 2013 la 
suma de U$S 2.253 mil millones de dólares, habiendo crecido un 340% en los últimos 10 años y 
haciendo con que la economía brasilera sea 5,5 veces más grande que la argentina. A su vez, las 
Fuerzas Armadas brasileras están compuestas por 327.000 tropas activas y su presupuesto alcanzó 
en 2013 la suma de U$S 30,3 mil millones. Por su parte, el número de tropas activas en la 
Argentina es de 86.000 y el presupuesto militar es de U$S 5,2 mil millones, tan solo 15% del 
brasilero." 
According to World Bank statistics, the gross domestic product of Brazil in 2013 reached the sum of 
US $2.253 billion dollars, growing 340% over the past 10 years and indicating that the Brazilian 
economy is 5.5 times larger than Argentina's. In turn, the Brazilian Armed Forces are composed of 
327,000 active troops, and its budget reached the amount of US $30.3 billion in 2013. Meanwhile, 
the number of active troops in Argentina is 86,000 and the military budget is US $5.2 billion, only 
15% of the Brazilian budget. 
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Abstract 
Framing effects on foreign policy: experimental evidence from emerging countries and the 
Argentine-Brazilian rivalry 
 
Civil society plays an increasingly important role in the formulation of foreign policy in emerging 
countries. This article investigates whether public opinion is sensitive to framing effects regarding 
foreign policy. Data from a survey experiment with a sample of 1,530 students at the Universidad de 
Buenos Aires and the Universidad Nacional de Avellaneda, we find that participants are sensitive to 
framing effects on foreign affairs. The interviewees changed their preferences when stimulated by 
information regarding Brazilian economic growth and military expenditure in comparison with 
Argentina. In turn, this effect was more pronounced among a) people who tend to stay less 
informed regarding foreign affairs and b) individuals who are more nationalistic.  
 
Keywords: framing effects; survey experiment; foreign policy; Argentina; Brazil 
 
 
Resumo 
 
Efeitos de enquadramento em política externa: evidência empírica de países emergentes e a 
rivalidade argentino-brasileira 
 
A sociedade civil desempenha um papel cada vez mais importante na formulação da política externa 
nos países emergentes. Este artigo investiga se a opinião pública é sensível a efeitos de framing no 
que diz respeito à política externa. Através de um survey experimental aplicado a uma amostra de 
1530 estudantes na Universidad de Buenos Aires e na Universidad Nacional de Avellaneda, 
descobrimos que os participantes são sensíveis a efeitos de framing em temas de política exterior. 
Os entrevistados mudaram suas preferências quando foram estimulados com informações sobre o 
crescimento econômico brasileiro e os gastos militares de forma comparada com a Argentina. Por 
sua vez, esse efeito foi ainda mais pronunciado entre a) pessoas que tendem a se informar menos 
sobre assuntos internacionais e b) entre indivíduos mais nacionalistas.  
 
Palavras-chave: efeitos de framing; experimento de survey; política externa; Argentina; Brasil 
 
 
Resumen 
 
Efectos de encuadramiento en política externa: Evidencia de países emergentes y la rivalidad  
argentino-brasilera 
 
La sociedad civil desempeña un papel cada vez más importante en la formulación de la política 
externa de países emergentes. Este artículo indaga si la opinión pública es sensible a efectos de 
framing en lo que concierne a política externa. A través de un survey experimental, aplicado a una 
muestra de 1530 alumnos en la Universidad de Buenos Aires y en la Universidad Nacional de 
Avellaneda, encontramos que los participantes fueron sensibles a efectos de framing en temas de 
política exterior. Los entrevistados cambiaron sus preferencias cuando recibieron información 
respecto al crecimiento económico brasilero y sus gastos militares de forma comparada con la 
Argentina. A su vez, este efecto fue más pronunciado entre: a) personas que tienden a informarse 
menos sobre asuntos internacionales y b) individuos más nacionalistas.  
 
Palabras clave: efectos de framing; survey experimental; politica externa; Argentina; Brasil 
 
 
Résumé  
Les effets de cadrage sur la politique étrangère: La preuve expérimentale des pays émergents et la 
rivalité argentino-brésilienne 
 
La société civile joue un rôle de plus en plus important dans la formulation de la politique étrangère 
dans les pays émergents. À travers une enquête auprès de 1530 élèves de l'Université de Buenos 
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Aires et de l'Universidad Nacional de Avellaneda, nous avons constaté que les participants étaient 
sensibles aux effets de cadrage concernant les affaires étrangères. En effet, les préférences des 
personnes interviewées changeaient lorsqu'elles étaient stimulées par des informations concernant 
la croissance économique et les dépenses militaires brésiliennes, en comparaison avec l'Argentine. 
De plus, cet effet était plus prononcé chez a) les gens qui ont moins tendance à se tenir informés 
des affaires étrangères et b) les gens plus nationalistes. 
 
Mots-clés: effets de cadrage; enquete; politique étrangère; Argentine; Brésil 
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